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In Ihc past decade the developing counitries  have  income losses in excess of 18 percent in 30 years
tried much harder to achieve macroeconomic  if tariffls  are about 50 percent.
stability than they have to eliminate inefficien-
cies from microeconomic distortions.  The existence of labor market distortions
causing unemployment may increasc the social
L6pez has pursu  a relatively new line of  valuc of capital.  Capital accumulation moves tliC
in-quiry  in cxamining measurement of the social  economy closer to the production possibility
income losses induced by thc reduction of the  frontier by increasing employment.
investment efficicncy caused by tradc distor-
tions.  This study confirms earlier findings about
the relativelyn  modest efficiency losses caused by
Empirical findings of the study suggest a  the indcpcidenit effects of specific distortionis.
strong negativc cffect ol trade distortions on the  L6pez also found, however, a significant syner-
social efficiency of investment.  Even a moder-  gistic cfiect when trade and wage distortions
ate, uniform tariff of 50 percent could cause a  coexist and lead to larger efficiency losses.
reduction in the efficiency of investment of up to
23 percent compared with a 0 percent tariff.  The key issue is the combination of price
distortions favoring capital-intensivc activity
The (social) income losses caused by the  with wage distortions that cauise  unemploymcnt
reduced investment efficiency are considerable.  and underemployment.  This patteni of distortion
Countries that havc a moderate investment ratio  is pervasive in developing countries.
(about 20 percent of GDP) can experience social
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During the last decade less developed countries (LDCs) strived much hal,er  to  achieve
macroeconomic  stability  than to eliminate  inefficiencies  arising from microeconomic  distortions. Policy
makers in LDCs have been in most cases quite reluctant to implement even mild reforms to reduce
microdistortions regardless of  the  country's  growth performance and  degree of  macroeconomic
stability.}' Several prominent  economists,  on the other hand, have recently provided  intellectual  support
to this situation.  Dornbusch  (1990), Krugman (1990), and Rodrik (1989) among others have espoused
the idea that macroeconomic  stability  is central  to growth while microeconomic  distortions  are at best of
secondary  importance. For example,  Dornbusch  (1990)  states, "In a first round  the country  should move
from quotas and licenses to a uniform, high tariff of say 50 percent.  Later, when the economy  booms
and the external balance  can support liberalization  without  the risk of an exchange  crisis, tariffs can be
taken down to  10 percent."a' Dornbusch  and others argue (iat macroeconomic  stability is a necessary
condition  (the sufficient  one would  be debt reduction  and official  stabilization  loans) to bring capital  back
to LDCs and enable them to grow at a rapid pace.  By contrast, the removal of distortions in areas of
trade, labor  markets, financial  sector, and agricultural  pricing  will  generate  only a once-and-for-all  (small)
efficiency gains and thus should proceed only to the extent that it does not make the achieveirent of
macroeconomic  stability  more difficult.
1/  This reluctance of policy makers in removing microdistortions  is probably due to the political
power of pressure groups that have historically  benefitted from the existing distortions.  The
resistance  to remove  distortions  is clearly  shown by the fact that after a decade of massive  efforts
and  money provided by  the  World Bank, other  international organizations and  Western
governments  to support "structural  adjustment"  in LDCs, only a few of them  have made any real
progress iri this respect on a sustainable  basis.
Z/  Needless  to say, given the general lack of interest of policy makers in removing  distortions, the
21w  and "less important"  stage of the Dornbusch  proposal is not likely to be put in place in the
near future.2
This view relies on two basic premises, one of them explicit and the other one not always
artic. laied: (1) 'he  once-and-for-all  efriciency  gains of removing  distortions  are small, and (2) the social
efficiency  of investment  is not seriously hurt by the microdistortions. The first premise is obviously
necessary  because if the static gains are indeed large, whether occurring  on a once-and-for-all  basis or
distributed through time resembling slower "economic  growth" for a period of time, more serious
consideration  would  need to be given  to the possible  trade-offs  between  delays in achieving  macrostability
and the removal of  distortions.  The existing studies aimed at measuring the potential gains from
removing distortions  rely on computable  general equilibrium  (CGE) models. The evidence  from these
studies is that efficiency  gains from the removal  of trade distortions  are relatively small - typically 2%
of the GDP or less.y These studies may, however, underestimate  these gains if trade distortions  coexist
with factor market and other distortions provided that a synergy or mutually reinforcing effect takes
place.
An essential feature of the structure of distortions in a large number of LDCs is that high
protection  to capital-intensive  import-competing  activities coexists  with important  real wage distortions
(Krueger, 1978; Bhagwati, 1978).  There are good reasons to expect that the effects of real wage
distortions  and tariff protection  tend to reinforce  each other when  tariffs protect capital  intensive  sectors.
A tariff increase in this case may cause a fall in employment  due to the shifting  of the structure of the
economy  further toward capital intensive activities. Thus, in this case a tariff would not only lead to
price efficiency  losses  but also would cause  the economy  to move  further inside  the production  possibility
frontier. Similarly,  a worsening  of the real wage distortion  would  not only move the economy  inside  the
production  frontier but also would worsen  the effect  of the tariff distortio..  by expanding  capital intensive
activities and reduce labor intensive  outputs.
I/  The exceptions are Harris (1984) who employs  a model with economies  of scale and product
differentiation  and de Melo et al (1986) who obtained  larger gains by considering  rent seeking
activities arising from trade distortions.3
The second premise is perhaps even more relevant  despite that is rarely explicitiy discussed in
this context.  If the social efficiency  of investment  is seriously  affected by distortions, the rapid capital
accumulation  effort that macro  bility may bring will  be largely wasted if the distortions  are maintained.
Distortions  create a wedge  between  the private rate of return  of capital  and the social one, and thus a high
private rate of return may be consistent  with a low (even negative)  social rate of return of capital if
distortions  remain in place. The existence  of this wedge  has two possible  implications. First, due to lack
of confidence  of investors exercising  their "waiting  option," the international  effective  interest rate may
be between the private and the social rate of return of capital before the macroreforms.  If investors'
confidence  is restored by improved  macroeconomic  stability while keeping  domestic  distortions, capital
inflows  will occur.  But since the marginal  cost of capital (i.e., the internatioral interest rate) is greater
than the social return of capital, the country will necessarily  experience  a nea  loss of income. This is of
course the well known  case of immiserizing  growth  that occurs when capital  accumulation  is financed  out
of foreign savings (Bhagwati, 1973, Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro,  1977).  Ibis argument considerably
weakens  the case for macro stabilization  maintaining  high tariff rates supported  by Dornbusch  and others
at least for countries that are likely to finance the increased  capital accumulation  mostly out of foreil
savings.
The second possibility,  which is the most pertinent  to this paper, concerns  the case when capital
accumulation  is primarily  financed out of domestic  savings. In this case, immiserizing  growth does not
necessarily  take place as shown by Johnson (1967), Bertrand and Flatters (1971) and Martin (1977).4'
This literature shows the conditions  under which capital accumulation  financed out of domestic savings
is immiserizing  and, more generally, the conditions  under which increasing  tariffs to capital intensive
goods will decrease the social return of capital.  A problem of directly applying  these analyses  to real
4/  This is also a problem that the literature on negative  shadow  prices deals with (i.e., Srinivasan
and Bhagwati, 1978).4
empirical situations  is, however, that the models  used are "even," and assume  that all firms are identical
uip  to a scale facte  This implies  that in the long-run,  the zero profit condition  in a small open economy
determ  -,s the private factor returns independently  from factor endowments.1' Empirically  one needs
to relax these assumptions  allowing  for "uneven"  models and heterogenous  firms.
A central  empirical question  is, therefore, whether  microdistortions  cause  a significant  loss in the
efficiency  of investment. If the distortions  protect  capital intensive  sectors  then the social return  . . capital
is less than the private return and vice versa if the domestic distortions protect the labor intensive
activities. If the microdistortions  bias the structure of production  toward capital intensive  activities  then
capital accumulation  will exacerbate  the effects  of the distortions  by inducing  an even greater expansion
of the capital intensive sectors in detriment of the labor intensive sectors which were already being
produced  below the social optimum. Thus in this case the social margnal effect of capital is equal  to the
private return less the loss in welfare caused  by the worsening  of the effect of the distortion associated
with capital accumulation. Alternativ-ly, if tariffs protect labor intensive  outputs  then there is a welfare
loss because  capital intensive  output levels are too low relative to labor intensive  outputs.  In this case,
capital accumulation  by promoting greater relative growth of capit31  intensive activities will cause a
reduction  of the tariff induced  welfare  loss.  Hence, the social return of capital is higher than the private
one by the extent by which the negative  effect of the tariff distortion is reduced by increasing  capital.
As shown in Section I, the fact that the social rate of return of capital is below the private one
in the presence  of distortions,  however, does not necessarily  mean that a reduction  of such distorti3ns  will
lead to a highet social rate of return.'  Reducing  distortions  that protect capital intensive activities  has
two opposing  effects on the social rate of return: (i) the wedge between the private and social rates is
5/  Or, equivalently,  the revenue function  becomes  linear in the long-run.
6/  In the HIeckscher-Ohlin  "even" model, however, reducing  distortions  favoring capital intensive
activities necessarily  increase the social shadow  price of capital.5
reduced thus causing the social rate to increase at a given private rate; (ii) the private rate of return is
reduced thus having the oppcs.ce  effect on the social rate.  The net effect of reducing  distortions  on the
social rate is thus an empirical rnatter.  If  microdistortions  actually reduce the social efficiency of
investment  then there would be additional dynamic welfar" losses for countries where increasing the
aggregate capital/labor  ratio is an important  source of grow.  as is the case for practically  all LDCs.7'
It is surprising  that despite  the large number  of empirical  studies devoted  to measuring  the welfare losses
originated in economic distortions, the evaluation  of the possible losses due to decreased investment
efficiency  has never been performed.
The purpose of this paper is to conceptually  and empirically evaluate the two premises just
discussed. Specifically,  we intend  to: (i) analyze  and empirically  estimate  the magnitude  of the social loss
caused  by the combination  of tariff distortions  and real wage distortions;  (ii) reconsider  the conventional
models used to analyze  the relationsbips  between  tariffs and the marginal  social efficiency  of capital by
incorporating the existence of both trade and labor market distortions and by relaxing the "even'
assumption  so pervasive  in the theoretical  literature  on immiserizing  growth; and (iii) empirically  measure
the dynamic welfare losses that may exist if distortions  reduce the social return of capital.
The empirical  part of the analysis  uses data  from Chile  for the period 1974-89. Rather  than using
parameters  from different sources, we proceed with a compret  ve econometric  estimation  of all the
required parameters  within a unified  empirical  framework. This goes a long way in solving  the problem
of consistency  so prevalent in analyses  of this nature when parameters  obtained from different sources
are incorporated  into CGE models. We choose the case  of Chile to illustrate  the analysis  mostly  because
7/  The fact that the capital/labor  ratios rapidly increase through time is a justification  for focusing
on the social efficiency of capital rather than of labor.  Distortions that reduce the social
efficiency  of capital may at the same time increase  that of labor.  These distortions  would cause
dynamic welfare losses due to  investment efficiency reductions but  also dynamic gains if
employment  is also increasing through time.  However, if the capital/labor ratio is increasing
through time, the net dynamic welfare  effect under constant  returns to scale will still necessarily
be negative.6
of the transparency of the microdistortions  (particularly the trLde  distortions that consist in a uniform
tariff rate) and the availability  of good time series data.  Moreover, we show that the structure of
distortions in Chile, in particuar &e combination  of protecting capital intensive activities and wage
distortions, is quite representative  of what prevails in the majority of LDCs although  the distortio.ns  are
substantially  more moderate  and fewer than in most other countries. Therefore, one would reasonably
expect that the results for Chile are relevant to many other countries  as well.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:  in section I we present a conceptual
framework followed by section 1I that introduces the empirical model, econometric results and an
evaluation  of the static welfare losses caused  by the coexistence  of tariff and labor distortions. Section
III is devoted to the evaluation of the investment  efficiency effects of distortions and corresponding
dynamic  social income  losses. In section  IV we discuss  the applicability  of the results for Chile to other
countries  and the last section summarizes  the main conclusions.
1. The Conceptual  mode!
We assume  that the import  substitution  sector includes  two industries,  one producing  final goods
and the other producing  intermediate  goods. The rest of the economy  is comprised  of an export  sector.
We define social income as aggregate  GDP evaluated  at world prices. If the trade distortion consists  of
a uniform tariff, social income is equal to GDP at domestic prices less the rents accruing to domestic
producers of import substitutes  due to the tariff,
(1)  R'  =  R[(1+)p  P2,(1 +?)p;; 4LK,  K  - ?[p;RI *1  +p3R  R3]
where R* is the GDP at world prices, R, is GDP at domestic prices, r is the tariff rate affecting  final
import substitutes  and (imported)  intermediate  inputs; p, and p3 are their -espective  world prices, P2 is
the price of exportables, L is actual employment,  K is the stock of capital  and t a vector that may include7
other sector specific fixed factors of production  such as land, natural resources, etc. as well as an index
of technology. Also, RI(*) and R3(e) denote first partial derivatives  with respect to the first and third
arguments.  Thus  from  Hotelling's  lemma,  R 1 = QM  and  R 3 =  -Z where,  QM  is the domestic  production
of (final) import substitutes  and Z the net demand  for imports  of intermediate  inputs.  In the absence  of
quantitative restrictions to  imports (1+ r)pl and (1+ T)p3  are the domestic prices of the finai and
intermediate  import substitutes,  respectively.
The ensuing analysis of microdistortions  and the efficiency of capital will be entirely based
considering  R  rather than directly welfare. Of course, there is a one to one correspondence  between  the
social efficiency  of capital measured as its effects  on R  and welfare. Similarly, in analyzing  the static
welfare effects  of wage distortions  and tariffs affecting  intermediate  inputs  that are not directly  consumed
the effect on R  is equivalent  to the effect on welfare.  This is so because capital accumulation,  wage
distortions  and tariffs on intermediate  inputs  can affect welfare  only through their effects  on R.  The only
problem  of not considering  welfare explicitly  is in accounting  the effects  of a tariff on final importables.
Tariffs on importables  affect welfare through both, their effects on R  and directly  through consumption
expenditures.  The latter effect is due to  the fact that a tariff on final importables also causes a
consumption  distortion.  One possibility is to interpret  T as a production subsidy on final importables
rather than as a tariff on imports  of final goods.
The fact that (1) does not explicitly  considers non-tradable  goods does not reduce the level of
generality of the analysis. As Dixit and Norman (1980) showed, under the usual instantaneous  market
clearing  and price homogeneity  assumptions,  the price of non-tradables  is a linearly  homogenous  function
of the domestic prices of all tradable goods.  This, in turin, implies that R(-) can be interpreted  as a
reduced form revenue function once the price of non-tradables has been substituted in.  Under the8
assumption  of constant returns to scale it can be sbown that all the properties of the original revenue
function are preserved in this "reduced  form' specitication.Q'
Due to the existence  of distortions in the labor market, there is unemployment  and, hence, the
employment  level is endogenous. We assume  that the wage rate is equal  to the market cleam  .ng wage rate
(i.e., the wage that would be consistent with full employment)  plus a mark-up that is not necessarily
fixed.  Thus,
(2)  w  w+  ,(w;  0),
where w  is the notional market clearing wage rate, A(o)  is a mark-up  function, and e is any exogenous
variable (i.e., unions market power) that may affect the mark-up. A negative  value for OA/lw implies
that, ceteris paribus, the richer an economy is the smaller will be the wage mark-up. Expression (2) is
a generalization  of various frequently used wage specifications. If, for example, 8A/w  =  -1, then
wages are rigid. If 81/8w' = 0, wages are fully  flexible, responding  to market changes,  although  actual
wages are at a higher level than market clearing  wages.2'
The value of w  is determined  by
(3)  RIJ.(l  + r)pj*, p2,  (1 + c)p';  L,  K, t]  = w,
where L  is the full employment  level and RL.  is the marginal  revenue product  of labor evaluated  at L.
Finally, the actual  level of employment  is determined  by
(4)  RL[(l  + SI)p;,  p2,  (1 + scp3;  L, K, t]  =  w.
A/  In the empirical  analysis  we do allow  for non-tradables  explicitly. In order to make  the empirical
analysis compatible with the conceptual model described in this section we also estimate a
reduced  form equation  for the price of non-tradables  and calculate  all elasticities  by including  the
direct as well as the indirect effects  via the price of non-tradables.
2/  See Lopez and Riveros (1990) for more details about  the theoretical  foundation  of (2).9
Now we can define more rigorously the labor market distorti-n by q M  (w-w)/w'  =  I/w', as the
proportion by which the actujal  wage rate is above the market clearing wage rate.  Here we assume  that
the  wage distortions apply to the  complete labor market and, thus,  for  any y>0  there is open
unemployment. More realistically  one would need to assume that the wage distortion only affect the
formal sector labor market where the  labor regulations are bind.ng and union activity is  more
prevalent.-L' In this case, open unemployment  would affect only those willing to work exclusively  in
the formal sector, while those willing  to work in the informal  sector wculd not be openly inemployed,
although their wages and productivity would be  substantially  lower (underemployment).  For our
purposes, however, all that matters is that a wage distortion will cause a fall in effective employment
whether through open unemployment or  underemployment  related to  the  increased labor market
segmenta^ion  that such a distortion  causes.
Thus, the existence  of labor market distortions  and the "uneven"  nature of the model (remember
that we are assuming  the existence  of sector spec.ric, fixed  factors represented  by vector t in R(e) imply
that w, cannot use the zero profit conditions  to determine  the wage rate and the private return of cap; al
as functions of  only output prices as in the Heckscher-Ohlin  model.  The specific conditions for
immiserizing  growth (or negative shadow price of capital) and in general for an inverse relatiotiship
between tariffs and the social or shadow price of capital will thus be quite different from those derived
in studies using the "even  Heckscher-Ohlin  model.
Consider  first the static losses  due to tariffs in the presence  of said wage distortions. Differentiate
totally expression  (1) with respect to r and express it in logarithmic  form,1'
1Q/  See Lopez and Riveros (1990) for an analysis  of labor market segmentation.
.U!  Keep in mind that strictly speaking  the correct interpretation  of x for final goods is that of a
production  subsidy rather than a tariff.  Henceforth  we will refer to r indistinctly  as a tariff on
nroduction  subsidy.10
'~alnQ,w,  ___In___ 
dlnR  2 R  jM-y-  ___  _a  1+a aInL  QS_S  _  _  S (5) -5t_  _~-  -XSM  mp  Olnp,  zanp  3i--1  SL-SM  +
8 QM 
dlac  snp  1+s  Rc  alpl  +  Wmlnp3  lp  h  alnL  a@^L  J
where SL Ea  I(alnR)/(alnL)J  is the share of labor in (privite) income, SM  B  [plQM/RJ, SZ EB p3Z/RJ are
the shares of fin.'  importable  production  and of imports  of intermediates  in total income R, respectively.
It can be shown that the elasticity  of employment  with respect to the tariff is
(6)  8lnL  r  8aInL +  aInL
8tn c  1 +  a  m  ainp 1 aInp 3)
and  that  R  =  1 +t
R  1+r(I-SM+SZ)
The first three terms of the left-hand  of expression  (5) account for the conventional  efficiency
losses  of increasing  the tariff or production  subsidy  on importables. If the domestic  production  of import
substitutes increases and imports of intermediate  inputs decline (i.e.,  which is likely to occur when
domestic  production  of intermediates  expands),  in response  to a tariff increase, efficiency  losses  worsen.
In fact, given a single tariff the sum of the first 3 right-hand  terms inside the bracket is necessarily
positive indicating that social income d'ereases when the tariff goes up.  The last 3 right-hand terms
account for the employment  effect of raising a tariff.  If employment  falls after the tariff increase, i.e.,
if [(OlnL)/(8lnr)J  < 0, there is a further  social loss by moving  the economy  further inside  the production
possibility frontier.  This is captured by the 4'h right-hand term in (5).  The last 2 right-hand terms
account for the indirect efficiency  effects caused  by employment  changes. If employment  falls, QM  is
likely to further increase and Z to fall if these goods are capital intensive,  i.e., if [(8lnQm)/(8lnL)J  < 0
and [(alnZ)/(alnL)J >  0.  In this case, the social loss of the tariff is increased further.
The effect of a wage distortion on social revenue in the presence of a tariff distortion can be
estimated  by logarithmic  total differentiation  of (1)11
(7)  dlnR  il  R  aOL  S  l  s  s  aInL  ainZ)
dlnv  1I+fji  Ra 8lnwI  N  s  1X  naL  Bsz L).
The first right-hand term captures the direct effect of increasing  the wage distortion, i.e., the effect of
a fall in employment  moving  the economy  further inside  the production  possibility  frontier.  The last 2
terms capture the increased  losses in efficiency  associated  with the fall in employment. The employment
reduction increases production of  capital intensive goods that  are  protected by  the  tariff  (i.e.,
[(alnZ)/(8lnL)] <  0) leading to further efficiency  losses.
Next we derive an expression for the social return of capital which we simply define as the
elasticity  of GDP evaluated  at world  prices with respect  to capital. Totally  differentiating  (1) with respect
to K and expressing  this in logarithmic  form we obtain,
(8)  3lnR'  R  'c  1O+i  MnQM +s  aZ  eInL [S  +  S  lInQw Slnzl
aInK)Re  [  _-S  -KainK  aSZIK  alnK  IInL  z
where SK - [(alnR)/I(lnK)J , is the "private" return of capital, i.e.,  the percentage change in GDP
evaluated  at domestic  prices due to a one percent increase in the stock of capital.
In order to evaluate  expressions  (7) and (8) we need to determine  expressions  for MlnL/8lnt  and
(dlnL)/(dlnK),  respectively. Clearly, [(a1nL)/(alntq)J  =  ji  [(DlnL)/(alnw)]  < 0 which of course implies
that the sign of (7) is minus the sign of the term in square brackets. Thus, one could  not in principle  rule
out the possibility that increasing wage distortions lead to  a higher social income if the tariff r  is
sufficiently large.  This would require that the protected sectors be labor intensive (in which case
[(alnZ)/(8lnL)J  <  0).  As we have seen this is not likely to be the case in LDCs and thus the term in
square bracket is likely positive  with the effect  of the tariff reinforcing  the negative  effect  of i.  To obtain
an expression  for (aInL)/(alnK)  we use (2), (3), and (4),12
(9)  dL  _  L  [RL.,r(I  +Itw.)  -=
where R1x = [(8'R)/(OLOK)J  >  0, RLEc  = [(82R)/(8L  8K)] >  0, and RLL  = [(8 2R)/(8L&] < 0 under the
assumption  of concavity  of R(e).
Equation  (8) is the basic expression  that will guide  the empirical work on investment  efficiency.
The idea is to obtain estimates  of the parameters  using this expression  in order to derive some notion  of
the social efficiency of capital as opposed to the private one represented by sk. The correction  of sk
indicates  how the effect of tariff distortions is worsened  or improved  by capital accumulation  (the 2nd
and 3rd right-hand  terms) and how the effect of the labor market distortion on social income is affected
by an increase in capital (the three terms in square bracket). If the domestic  production  of final import
substitutes (QM) is capital intensive then [(OlnQ,)/(8lnK)] >  0  and, hence, the effect of capital
accumulation  will be to expand  further the domestic  production  of import substitutes  which were already
overproduced  due to the tariff protection. That is, capital accumulation  would in this case magnify  the
effect of the distortion. This would require a negative  correction  of the private rate of return of capital
as shown by the negative sign of the 2nd right-hand  term.  If production of Q, is labor intensive  then
(8lnQm)/(alnK)  <  0 in which case there would be a positive correction.  Similarly, if imports of
intermediate  inputs are substitutes  with capital, i.e., if [(8lnZ)/(8lnK)]  < 0 capital accumulation  would
worsen  the original distortion  by reducing  even  further the import of intermediates  which were below its
social optimum due to the tariff.  This implies a negative correction on the private return of capital.
Substitutability  between imports  of intermediate  inputs  and capital  may arise because  domestic  production
of intermediate  inputs is capital intensive  and/or because capital and intermediates  are substitute  inputs
in domestic production.
The second set of corrections  are related to the wage distortion which have caused the economy
to be inside the production  possibility  frontier. If there are no wage distortion (no unemployment)  tj =13
0, I(alnL)/(8lnK)I  = 0  and there are no further corrections to make.  If, however, 1q  > 0 an increase
in the stock of capital will cause  the economy  to move closer to the production  possibility  frontier since
in this case [(alnL)/(alnK)]  > 0. This requires  a positive  correction  reflected  by the term [(dlnL)/(dlnK)]
SL  (1 +T)/T.  The last two right-hand  terms in (8) reflect  the indirect  efficiency  effects associated  with the
increase in employment. If importable  production is labor intensive then [(alnQm)/(IlnL)  >  0  which
would have a negative effect on the social return of capital because production of a protected output
would further increase.  Similarly, if an increase in employment induces a reduction on imports of
intermediate  inputs, the social efficiency  of investment  would be further reduced.
Finally we consider the net effect of a tariff on the social marginal  revenue product of capital.
Totally differentiating  expression  (1) first with respect to K and next with respect to r we obtain,
(10)  =R  =_  T [p  +2RI,  2p'p 3Rl3R+  p;  R33K]
where R=  = (aR%/(MK),  etc. We have assumed  in (10) that there are no wage distortions. The above
effect in the presence  of wage distortions  is substantially  more complex  involving  several other 3r order
terms.  In the empirical  sections we will use numerical  methods  to calculate  the equivalent  of (10) with
wage distortions. Here we only want to illustrate  the fact that the net effect of a tariff change on the
social return of capital necessarily  depends on third order terms.  Needless to say, the fact that third
derivatives  are rarely explicitly  considered  in most analyses  does not imply  that they are negligible. The
terms R22,  R 33, are the slopes of the supply of final importables  and demand for intermediate  inputs.
Thus, the key determinant  of (10) is how capital accumulation  affects  the slopes  of the supply curves of
final importables  and demand for intermediate  inputs.  If these curves become more elastic as capital
expands (i.e., Rp&  >  0, i,j =  2,3) the social efficiency  of capital will decrease with the tariff and vice
versa.14
In contrast  with the conventional  case the function  Rk a  r, where r is the private rental price of
capital, is dependent  not only on output prices but also on factor endowments. The fact that the function
R(.) is symmetric  implies that the term R22K,  R 33K, R23K  correspond  to the curvature  of the private capital
rental price function with  respect to  the output prices of  the two protected goods (i.e.,  R.  =
[(a 2r)/8p 22J, etc.  In the Heckscher-Ohlin  "even" model r is a convex  function of the protected output
price.  This is due to the concavity  of the cost function in factor prices.  This implies that the term in
square brackets in (10) is necessarily  positive and thus, immiserizing  growth is always possible in the
Heckscher-Ohlin  model at a sufficiently  high tariff.2v Moreover, the social return of capital is always
decreasing in T for T >  0.  In models where the "evenness"  condition  is not satisfied or in models  that
do not assume the long-run zero profit condition with identical firms, however, there is no reason to
assume that immiserization  will take place regardless  of the tariff level.  In general, there is no reason
to impose any restrictions  on the third derivatives  of the revenue function and thus the social return of
capital may be an increasing  or decreasing  function  of tariffs.  This is purely an empirical matter.
II.  The Empirical Model
The model is estimated  for Chile using ainual data for the period 1974-1989. The micro policy
environment  in Chile 1974-89  was  very stable, highlighting  the role of markets and the private sector as
dominant factors.  The economy in general was subject to very few distortions  with the exception  of
moderate import tariffs and a period of binding wage indexation  extending  from 1974  until 1983. The
existence  of a government  enforced backward  wage indexation  in an environment  of declining inflation
contributed  to maintain real wages substantially  above the market clearing wage and to high rates of
unemployment. Even after the elimination  of official indexation  in 1983, indexation  practices in the
12/  Note that the slope of the function  r in the output prices gives the sign of dRk/dc  .15
private sector lingered  for a while. Unemployment,  although  declining  since 1985, continued  to be quite
high until the late eighties (1988) when the rate of unemployment  stabilized at about 7-8%, which is
considered  to be about the natural rate in Chile. Import  tariffs  were uniform  and fluctuated  between  75%
in the early part of the period to as low as of 10% in 1982. Between 1983  and 1985 tariffs fluc.uated
between 15 and 30%.  Since 1986 import tariffs have been constant  at 15%.
The empirical  model is oriented to obtain  quantitative  estimates  of the various elasticities  required
by equations (5), (7), (8) and (10).  In order to obtain consistent estimates of these elasticities in a
systematic way we need to  -Srive a comprehensive  specification  of the structure of production of the
economy.  We derive and estimate  the structure of production  using a revenue or GDP function. The
revenue function  corresponds quite closely to the usual representation  of the production structure used
in modem versions of international  trade models!3'. In this specification  revenue is a function of the
various output prices, imported input prices, capital, labor and an index  of technology.
i. I  The Revenue  or GDP Function
A nominal  multi-output  revenue  or GDP  function  under the assumption  of competitive  equilibrium
and profit maximization  can be represented  as follows:
(11)  R(pf'P{  Pp, q; K. L,  t)  e  max  {PNQN  +  PMQU  +  PXQX  -PZZ:  F (QNX  Qw Qe Z; K, L, t) =  0)
QNI QW  QX1  Z
where PN,  PM.  PX  and p. are the domestic  prices of non-tradables,  importables,  exportables  and imported
intermediates  respectively, QN,  Q,M,  Q.  are the level of domestic production of non-tradables, import
substitutes  and exportables, Z is the level of net imports of intermediate  materials, K is the stock of
capital, L is employment,  t is an index of technology, and F(e) is the production  possibility  set.
13/  See, for example, Dixit and Norman (1980).16
The (nominal)  revenue function is homogeneous  of degree one in PN.  PM.  p, and p 5 and, hence,
we can choose to normalize by p 5 to obtain revenue in units of the exportable commodity.  Under
constant  returns to scale in capital and labor, R(e) is also linearly  homogenous  in K and L and hence  we
can express real revenue  or GDP per capita as a function  of the capital/labor  ratio,
(12)  A - A(pl. p2. pS; k  t))
where  R is real  per capita  GDP  expressed  in units  of the exportable  good,  p,  - PN/PX.  P2 '  PM/PX.
P3-  p.Ip., are the relative prices of non-tradables,  final importables  and imported  intermediate  materials
also expressed in units of the exportable  price, and k *  K/L is the capital/labor  ratio.
By Hotelling's lemma (Diewert, 1974)  one can obtain the following  specification  for the output
supply and net demand for intermediate  inputs,
(13)  (1)  QNIL  Al (PI  P2. pS; k, t)
(Ii)  QUIL  - Al(pI, P2, p3; k  t)
(ill)  -ZIL  = A2(p,  p2,  p 3;  )
(iv)  QIL  - A()  - P  I 1(.) - P242(.)  - P 3A,(.)
where R1(.) is the first derivative  with respect to pl, R2(e) to p2, etc. Furthermore, specifying  a suitable
functional  form for R(e) one can derive the complete  system of estimating  equations  from (13).  We use
an extended  quadratic specification  that allows to estimate the third order terms that will determine the
net effect of tariffs on the social return of capital,
(14)  A - be +  bNPI  + bmP2  + b^p 3 + 1  +  bP2  + 2bzps  + bpp 2 + bipp  + bgp2p, +  bk
*  bj&p 1k +  b,tp2k +  b  2p,k  +  p  P,k  +  1  p22k+  2  zpk2k +  PNAplP 2k + P,plp3k
+ Pup2p3k + b,t +  bw,pl  t +  bm,p2t  +  bap 3t +  actk217
where dhe  b,,  Puk and are ak  fixed parameters.
Using (14) in (13) we obtain an explicit representation  of the output supply and net demand for
intermediate  inputs,
(15)  (i)  QNIL - =N  +  bjpl  +  bNmp 2 +  b,zp3 + bNgk  +  b,t  + PM4pIk  + PM&P 2k +  y,p'3k
(ii)  QUIL  bM  +  bN,p1 + bmMP2  +  b  .zp3  + bA,a + b,t  + PoMP2k +  NPk  + pAIt3k
(iii)  - ZIL  bz +bap1 +  bAap 2 +  bzp,  +  bz&k  +  bat + lp,kPs +  PZaEp 1 +  pmp 2lk
(iv)  x/L -bo  ~t b.xs  - bwP  2  2a#  bPP  - bmplps - bwzp2ps  + bkt  +  b,t (iv)  QI  m2--  bp  NPP
2  p 2 kk-ppk~ppkrt 3
2MQP  2k-  (  2  ,op2k -I  P  Stp,k  - pp,pkP-P  mppk  - Ppp  + a  k2
Relating (15) to expression (10) we have that Ruk  =  O.i  Accordingly,  a sufficient condition  for the
social return of capital to be a decreasing function of the tariff rate or, equivalently for (10) to be
negative,  is that Pw&,  MAm,  Om  >  0.  Furthermore,  concavity  of the revenue function  in k requires  that
o-Kx  <  0.  Note that the symmetry conditions  have been imposed in (14) and (15) thus substantially
decreasing  the number of parameters  to be estimated. Finally, the revenue function should be convex
in prices, a condition that is not a priori imposed.
11.2 Estimation  Prcedure  an  Results
We estimate the system of equations  (15) by specifying  a vector of additive  disturbances  which
we assume to be identically  distributed normal random  vectors with mean vector zero.  The model is
estimated using an iterative version of Zellner's method for seemingly unrelated regression equations
(SUR) which is equivalent  to a maximunm  likelihood  procedure.  The use of this method allows us to
impose  the symmetry  restrictions  thus substantially  reducing  the number  of estimating  parameters.18
All variables are normalized  to unity in 1977 except the time trend variable used to represent
t.'- 4 In order to allow for the possible endogeneity  of the price of non-tradables  (p,) and the capital-
labor ratio (k) we use an instrumental  variables/principa;  compone- method  to obtain the predicted  values
for p,, k, and of all variables that include  the terms p, and/or k.  These predicted  values are used in the
actual regression equations.
Table I reports the estimates  of the system  of four equations  (15). In general, the goodness-of-fit
of the estimates judged by the t-statistics is very satisfactory.  Moreover, the sign pattern of  the
coefficients  is consistent  with the theoretical  restrictions  implied  by competitive  profit maximization. In
particular, the required convexity  properties  of R(e) are satisfied  at all data points which implies that all
the own price elasticities  cf output supply are positive  when evaluated  at every sample point. Also, the
own price demand elasticity for intermediate  inputs is negative at all sample points.  Moreover, the
negative  sign of the atKK  coefficient  indicates  that the revenue function  is concave in k.
Another important  result shown in Table I is the high degree of significance  of two of the third
order terms (1 3J.  This suggests  that the effect of tariff changes  on the social efficiency  of capital is non-
trivial (see equation (10)).  In particular, the large positive and highly significant  value of Oak  (=  R33k)
indicates  that the effect of a tariff on imports  of intermediate  inputs has a strong negative  effect on the
social efficiency  of capital.  Similarly, the significant  and negative value of ftw& (=  R2&)  implies that
a tariff on final importables  would increase the marginal social efficiency  of capital.  As can be seen
below the net effect of a uniform  tariff affecting  both ;mportable  goods on capital efficiency  is negative.
That is, the intermediate input effect largely dominates the effect of a tariff on final importables.
According  to the analysis  presented  in section 1, this implies  that the social or shadow  price of capital is
generally decreasing in the tariff level.  Therefore, at a sufficiently  high tariff rate, the social return of
capital necessarily  becomes negative. Increasing  tariff, ceteris paribus, will stimulate  greater investment
JA/  See appendix  for details about  the data set.19
due to the fact that the private return of capital increases.  But at the same time the social return is
reduced, and at a sufficiently  high tariff the social return becomes negative.  Thus, the possibility of
immiserizing  gorwth is real even if investmlent  is fully financed  out of domestic savings.
Table 1.A shotvs the estimates  of the reduced form equation of the price of non-tradables  (pi).
The positive  sign of the price of final importables  is consistent  with  the presumption  that final importables
and  non-tradables are substitutes in production and demand.  The negative sign of the price of
intermediates  suggests  that an increase in the price of intermediate  inputs causes a reduction in national
income which in turn {. creases !jmes ic demand for non-tradables,  thus having a negative  effect on the
price of non-tradables. The elasticities  of Table 1.A are used to calculate  the net elasticity  of supply  and
demand consistent  with the theoretical  framework  of section 1.
The theoretical  consistency  of the estimates  is more  clearly reflected  in the plausibility  of the price
elasticities  shown in Table 2.  All own price elasticities  for the three outputs considered  are positive and
the own price demand elasticity for (imported) inputs is negative  as expected. Among  the three outputs
the most elastic is the production of import substitutes with an own price elasticity of 0.66, while
exportable  production  is moderately  elastic  with an elasticity  of approximately  0.5 and production  of non-
tradables is  Aite  inelastic (0.38).  All three outputs suffer substantially  when the prices of imported
inputs increase. Demand for imported intermediates  is relatively elastic  with an own price elasticity  of
-0.68.
The net or reduced form price elasticities  explicWy  considering  the effects through the price of
non-tradables  are shown in Table 2.A.  These elasticitis  add a correction factor to the elasticities in
Table 2.  For example,  the own price elasticity  of QM  is equal to the one reported in Table 2 plus the in-
direct effect of a change in PM  through the price of non-tradables.  This indirect effect is the elasticity  of20
Table 1.  SUR ESTIMATES  OF THE REVENUE  FUNCTION
CHILE 1974-°  0
Parameter  Parameter  value  t-statistic
bo  0.61  2.56
bN  1.26  2.98
bM  1.05  3.56
bz  -2.48  -4.80
bNN  0.59  1.11
bMM  1.98  4.54
bzz  -1.93  -3.32
bNM  0.044  0.48
bNz  -0.80  -5.60
bmz  -0.34  -1.84
bNK  0.24  0.55
bMK  -0.10  -0.35
bzr.  0.96  2.32
b,  0.0049  0.88
bN,  -0.012  -1.54
bM,  0.019  -3.17
b7>  0.029  3.01
PNNk  -0.18  -0.36
#MMk  -1.35  -2.81
iRm  2.91  5.73
IONMk  0.012  0.15
NZ;  -0.01  -0.25
#WuZ  0.0001  0.12
a,;,,  -2.6  -1.36
Table I.A.  REDUCED  FORM OLS ES1TMATES  Of THE PRCE  OF N1ON-TRADABLES
CHILE  1974-72
(double  log specification)
coeff7cjent  t-statistic
Constant  0.34  2.90
lg  P2  0.54  3.74
!og  P3  -0.58  -2.51
log k  0.75  1.65
time  -0.016  -2.74
R2 = 0.74  ;  R2=0.60
Dw=2.03  ;  F  =6.17  ;  N=  1521
QM  with respect to pN  (in Table 2) times the elasticity  of PN  with respect  to pM  Cable 1.A). That is, the
correction factor is 0.05 *  0.84  =  0.042 which is added to the partial own price elasticity in Table 2
(0.66) giving the net price elasticity  of QM  with respect to PM  (0.71). The elasticities  in Table 2.A;  re
consistent  with those used in the theoretical  exu,ressions  derived in Section  I.  In the calculations  of the
various effects we thus use Table 2.A rather than Table 2.
Table 3 provides the elasticities  of the three outputs and of imports of intermediate  inputs with
respect to capital. These elasticities  already include  the indirect  effects that take place through the price
of non-tradables. These are the key elasticities  required to estimate the social return of capital using
equation (8).  Several important implications emerge from Table 3.  First, the fact that domestic
production  of final import  substitutes  is negatively  affected  by an expansion  of capital suggests  that import
substitution of final goods are labor intensive rather than capital intensive.  Second, production of
exportables  is also negatively  affected  by capital  accumulation  but in a much  less dramatic  way indicating
that production  of exportables  is relatively more  capital  intensive  than domestic  production  of final import
substitutes.  This is not surprising because Chilean export activities mostly are resource extraction
(mining,  fishery, forestry, etc.), which are characterized  by a moderately  high capital/labor  ratio. Third,
the fact that imports  of intermediate  goods  are so strongly decreased  by capital  accumulation  suggests  that
domestic  production  of intermediates  is highly  capital  intensive. This is consistent  with casual  observation
of  industries that  typically produce  intermediate import substitutes in  Chile such  as  steel  and
petrochemicals,  which are considered  extremely  intensive  in capital. Another  possible reason explaining
the large negative effect of capital on imports of intermediates  may be the existence  of substitutability
between capital and intermediates  as inputs in domestic production.22
Table 2.  ME  A
CHU  1974-32
PN  PM  P.  PZ
QN  0.38  0.04  0.32  -0.74
QM  0.0S  0.66  -0.36  -0.35
Q.  0.28  -0.37  0.48  -0.39
Z  0.26  0.61  -0.18  -0.69
Table 2.A.  NU  PRICE ELASTICES  CONSIDERI  THE EFFECTS 3HROUGH
THE PRICE OF NON-TRDABLES
CHILE  1974-89
XPM  P.  PZ
Q.),,,  0.71  -0.35  -0.36
{X  -0.14  0.68  -0.54
Z  0.82  0.02  -0.8423
Table 3.  ELASTICIES  OF OUTPUT SUPPLY  AND DEMAND  FOR
_  AERMED1ATE  INPUTS  WONh  RESPECT  TO CAPlTAL
Evaluated  at  Ealuatedat  Evaluated  at
Mean Maim  127  ala  1288Values
QN  0.06  0.11  0.09
QM  -1.29  -1.40  -1.00
Q.  -0.14  -0.35  -0.10
Z  -2.69  -3.00  -1.83
111.  The Static Losses
The static losses of a 50% tariff and 25% wage distortion are provided in Table 4.  We choose
these distortions in view of the suggestion by Dornbush of maintaining uniform tariffs at 50% and
because  estimates  of Lopez and Riveros, 1990  suggest  that wages  were on average about 25% above  the
market clearing wage in Chile in 1974-89. In order to estimate  those losses we numerically integrate
expressions  (5) and (7) with integration  boundaries  of  -=O and  -r=0.5  for the tariff (eq. 5) and V=0 and
iq=0.25  for the wage distortion (eq. 7).  The labor demand elasticity  with respect to the wage rate and
to other prices is obtained from the coefficients  in Table 1 using tfie labor market equilibrium  condition
RL (M)  =  W. Thus, (DOnL)/(8lnw)  =  (w/2aKO  * (K/L) 2 while  the other labor demand  elasticities  are
estimated  using a similar procedure.  We note that in the numerical  integration  of (5) and (7) we allow
for the labor demand and other elasticities  to change as w, p,, p,, and KIL change.  In measuring  the
"pure" effect of the tariff (:.e., assuming no wage distortions)  we assume that [(clnL)/(Olnr)J  =  0 in
expression  (5).  Similarly,  to calculate  the pure effect  of a wage distortion  we assume r=0  In expression
(7).  To calculate the combined effect of the distortiozis  we use (5) and (7) without imposing any
restrictions.
The removal of the tariff would cause  a once-and-for-all  increase in GDP at world prices of the
order of 2.1% if there are no wage distortions.  Similarly,  the tariff distortion at 0% wage distortion24
reduces social income by 2.3%.  The combined  effect of the tariff and wage distortion  amounts  to 5.5%
of GDP which is greater than the sum of the effects  of each distortion  separately. What happens is that
the two distortions  reinforce each other. The negative  effect  of the tariff on social income  becomes  larger
in the presence of the wage distortion and vice versa.  If there are wage distortions, the tariff increase
will not only cause a price efficiency  loss but also a fall in employment  due to the fact that the tariff
protect essentially  capital  intensive  activities. A tariff in this case  lowers the virtual market  clearing  wage
rate and if the wage mark-up decreases to a lesser extent than the market clearing wage, employment
necessarily  falls. Similarly,  the employment  reduction  due to an increase in the wage distortion  will also
worsen the effect of the tariff distortion by inducing  an expansion  of the capital intensive activities  and
thus, wage distortions  are more detrimental  in the presence of tariffs.  In any case, it is important  to
emphasize  the quantative  importance  of the synergy effect between  the two distortions. This effect is of
the order of  1  % of GDP, that is,  more than 20a  of the sum of the independent effects of both
distortions.
Table 4.  STATIC OR ONCE-AND-FOR-ALL  SOCIAL  LOSSES OF A 50%
TARIFF AND 25% WAGE DISTORTION
(% of GD?' at world prices)
Tariff rate
Wage distortion  50%  0%
0%  2.1  0
25%  5.5  2.3
III.  Measuring  the Social Efficiency  of Capital
In this section we report on the evaluation  of the expression  (8) to measure the social efficiency
of capital. There are two parameters  in (8) that do not follow from the estimates  reported in the previous
section, namely, the proportion  by which the average wage is above the market clearing wage rate, q,
and the elasticity of the wage mark-up with respect to the market clearing wage, OIn  It/8ln w.  As25
indicated  before we use tq =  0.25 as estimated in Lopez and Riveros (1990).2  The average elasticity
8ln I/aln we fbund by Lopez and Riveros for Chile was -0.87 indicating  that any increase in the market
clearing wage rate causes a smaller increase in the a!,tual  wage rate.  This, in turn, implies that capital
accumulation  that increases w  (i.e., that increases the marginal social product of labor) will ceteris
paribus necessarily  decrease unemployment.
Row 1 in Table 5 shows the private returns of capital (Sk)  that would prevail if there were no
labor market distortions  at each tariff level.  As the tariff rate decreases from 50% to 0%, the private
returns of  capital also decline (from 0.53 to 0.50) due to the fact that the tariff protect domestic
production  of intermediate  goods, a highly capital  intensive  s"-tor.  The empirical  estimates  suggest  that
the intermediate  goods effects dominate  the negative  effect on the private return of capital of protecting
the final import substitutes  which are not capital intensive  activities.
The private returns of capital  need to be corrected  to consider  the effects  of tariffs. This is shown
in row 2 of Table 5.1Y This correction  decreases  as the tariff rate is reduced. Lowering  the tariff from
50% to 0% with no wage distortions  increases  the social return of capital about 20% from 0.42 to 0.50
(row 3). There is an 11 percentage  point gain due to the capital allocational  effect of the tariff but since
the private return of capital declines 3 percentage  points, there is a net gain of 8 percentage  points as
shown in row 3.
The social return of capital shows a net increase because the term R33k  =  z  is positive and
highly significant  dominating  the negative  value of R2., = #mm  (see equation 10), while  the effect of the
ether third order terms is negligible. What happens is that in Chile capital accumulation  causes a very
dramatic  increase in domestic production  of imported intermediates  and a large reduction  of its imports.
15/  A 25% wage distortion  would imply according  to our estimated  labor demand elasticity  of -0.14
that such a distortion would explain about 3.5 percentage  points of unemployment  beyond its
natural rate.
16/  Corrections in row 2 corresponds  to the sum of th 2nd and 3rd  right-hand  terms in equation (8).26
Table  5.  DEO  S mONO THE SOCIAL  RE  RN  OF CAPIAL
IKaiff  Rate
50%  15%  0%
1.  Private  returns  of capital 2
without  labor  distortions  0.53  0.52  0.50
2.  Tariff efficiency  correction  -0.11  -0.07
3.  Net  social  returns/
no labor  distortions  0.42  0.45  0.50
4.  Effect  of labor  distortions
on private  return  of capital 4 -0.051  -0.048  -0.043
5.  Employment  correction  0.08  0.09  0.098
6.  Indirect  price  efficiency
correction  0.02  0.01
7.  Net social  returns  of capital
with  labor  distortions  0.46  0.50  0.555
1.  The social  return  of capital  measures  the proportional  increase  of social  income  due  to a one  percent
increase  in the capital  stock  using  expression  (8).
2.  The private  return  of capital  measures  the pwoportional  effect  of increasing  capital  on total income
measured  at domestic  prices.
3.  It is assumed  that  ,q = 0.25.27
This aggravates the social losses of the tariff distortion because capital accumulation  leads to expand
production  and reduce imports  of a good that the country  was already  producing  too much  and importing
too little. The fact that capital  accumulation  causes domestic  production  of final importables  to fall does
not offset the previous effect according  to the empirical  results. Tat  is, by reducing  domestic  production
of final importables  capital  expansion  tends to decrease  the distortionary  effect of the tariff but this is not
sufficient to compensate  for the large reduction  on imports  of intermediate  inputs.
The existence  of labor market distortions  requires  three more corrections  in calculating  the social
return of capital. First, labor distortions  reduce the private return of capital because  they cause  a fall in
employment  which, in turn, decreases  the marginal  value product  of capital under the weak assumption
of gross complementarity  between capital and labor.  This correction is shown in row 4 of Table 5
fluctuating  between -0.051  when the tariff is 50% and -0.043 at a 0% tariff.
Second, capital accumulation  iaduces  greater employment  thus decreasing  the effect of the labor
market distortion. This enhances  the social value of capital because  expanding  capital would move the
economy  closer to the production  possibility  frontier.  This correction  is therefore positive as shown in
row 5 of  Table 5.  This  correction corresponds to  the  fourth right-hand term  in  equation (8).
Employment  increases  with capital accumulation  because wages increase less than the marginal  product
of labor.
Third, the indirect  price efficiency  correction  (row 6) accounts  for the fact that the expansion  in
employment  associated with capital accumulation  may cause changes in the output mixture that may
magnify  or decrease the effects  of the price distortion  on social income. As shown in Table 5 this effect
is positive as the tariff is greater than zero.  Expanding employment will reduce the size of the
intermediate  input sector and increase their imports, thus decreasing the effect of the tariff distortion.
This effect dominates  the effects  on the domestic final import substitution  sector.28
Finally, row 7 shows the net social return of capital once all the corrections required by the
simultaneous  existence  of tariffs and labor market distortions  are considered. As can be seen in row 7
the reduction of the production subsidy  or tariff from 50% to 0% in the presence of a wage distortion
of 25% rises the social return of capital from 0.46 to 0.555, about 21%.  The wage distortion effect at
each tariff rate can be obtained by comparing  rows 3 and 7.  The 25% wage distortion causes, ceteris
paribus, an increase  of the social return of capital  of about 10%. This is explained  by the fact that in the
presence  of unemployment  capital accumulation  induces  the economy  to become  closer to the production
possibility  frontier by reducing  unemployment. This implies, therefore, that the positive effect of labor
market distortions  on the efficiency  of investment  is transient and declining  with capital  accumulation  and
eventually  disappears  once unemployment  reaches the natural rate.  This is in sharp contrast with the
effect of tariff or othe,r  price distortions  on investment  efficiency,  which are likely to remain constant  and
even increase  as capital  expansion  takes place. The only limit  to the worsening  misallocation  of resources
induced  by capital  growth when capital intensive  activities  are protected  is the complete  specialization  of
the economy in the protected  activities.
Turning now to the likelihood  of immiserizing  growth, we estimated  the critical tariff level that
would cause, ceteris paribus, the social return of capital to be zero with and without  unemployment. In
the latter case the critical tr -iff level is about 1.85, meaning  that immiserizing  growth becomes  an issue
at a 185% tariff rate.  If there is unemployment  then the critical tariff level is even higher, about 260%.
Thus, although  the estimated  parameters  suggest that the conditions  for immiserizing  growth of capital
accumulation  financed by domestic savings are feasible, the required tariff levels at which this would
happen  are indeed very high.
Table 6 compares the contribution  of capital to growth in social income under a 50% and 0%
tariff assuming no uremployment.  Capital is assumed to grow alternatively  at 4%, 6%, and 8% per
annum. These capital growth rates roughly correspond  to gross investment  rates of the order of 16% to29
22% of GDP, which are within the range of observed investment  rates for most LDCs.  The first part
of Table 6 indicates  the contribution  of capital expansion  to social income growth calculated  according
to Table 5, under the assumption  of no unemployment  beyond the natural rate.  With a 50% uniform
tariff the social return of capital  is about  0.42 and with a 0% tariff the return would  be 0.50.  Therefore,
with a 50% tariff for example,  a 4% annual increase  in capital would  generate  an annual increase  in GDP
at world prices of 1.68% as shown in the corresponding  entry in Table 6.
The results in Table 6 are quite striking. The effect of eliminating  the 50% tariff is to accelerate
the annual  growth rate by almost  20%.  That is, a "moderate"  tariff rate of 50% causes a dramatic  waste
of the capital accumulation  effort which is translated into a 0.32, 0.48 and 0.64 percentage points
deceleration  of GDF growth for the slow, intermediate  and fast capital growth scenarios, respectively.
These large negative  effects  of tariffs  on the social efficiency  of investment  are rapidly translated
into a sizable loss of income which largely exceeds the static losses of tariff distortions.  In fact, the
second  part of Table 6 shows the total accumulated  increases in social income due to capital growth that
take place in a period of 30 years under each of the alternative  scenarios. The accumulated  additions  to
income  generated by capital expansion  are between  25% and 32% higher in the nontariff scenario than
in the 50% tariff scenario! Social income after 30 years is between 13.5% and 23.8% higher in the no
tariff case than in the 50% tariff case.  These large dynamic losses are dramatically  higher than the
conventional  static loss which in the case of Chile in 1975 (when tariffs were about 50%) were of the
order of 2. 1% of GDP. As can  be seen in the last part of Table 6, the losses  due to investment  efficiency
are between  6 and 1  1 times larger than the conventional  static losses. In fact, the investment  efficiency
losses would cause a GDP loss as large as the static losses in only 3 years in the high capital growth
scenario.30
Table  6. _  _  _  _ 
ALMINAM  JAMI  REGIME  AND CAPITAL  GROWT  RAES
1.  Annual  Capital  Contribution  to Social  Income  Growth
Annual  Capital  Growth  Rate
Tariff  Regime  4%  6%  8%
(1) 50%  1.68  2.52  3.36
(2)  0%  2.0  3.00  4.0
(3) Annual  Rate
Differential
(2) / (1)  1.19  1.19  1.19
II.  Increase  in Social  Income  in 30 Years
(4) 50%  64.8  110.9  169.5
(5)  0%  81.1  142.7  224.3
(6) Total  incomegap  after  12.1  17.2  22.4
30 years
* Due  to static
efficiency  losses  2.1  2.1  2.1
* Due  to dynamic  investment
efficiency  losses  10.0  15.1  20.331
IV.  The Relevance  of the Chilean Case for Other LDCs
Chile, as any other country, has certain peculiarities  that  awve  to be considered in judging the
potential  applicability  of the results obtained  for other countries. The extent of the price and labor market
distortions  in Chile throughout  the period under analysis  has been generally more limited than those of
many other LDCs.  Moreover, Chile has not used quantitative  restrictions  to imports  or exports and the
full extent of the price distortion  is embodied  in a uniform  tariff rate that has fluctuated  between  70% and
10% during the 1974-89  period.  Most other LDCs rely on both quantitative  restrictions (QRs) and
differentiated tariffs to restrict imports.  At the same time they partially compensate exports with
drawbacks  or other export promotion schemes.
The fact that in Chile price and wage distortions  are more  moderate  than in other countries  should
not affect the applicability  of the results for countries  that have greater distortions. Also the existence
of QRs to imports  or exports in other countries  should not affect the relevance  of the Chilean results for
these countries  in view of the well known  tariff equivalence  of QRs.
Tne fact that tariffs are differentiated in most countries may, however, affect the potential
applicability  of the results in these countries.  The large detrimental effects of tariffs on the social
efficiency  of capital  is explained  by the negative  effect of capital  accumulation  on imports  of intermediate
inputs which, in turn, is due to the substitutability  of capital and intermediates  and particularly to the
highly capital intensive  nature of their production  in the case of Chile.  In many LDCs tariffs tend to be
much lower for intermediates  than for final goods. This would in principle reduce the negative  impact
of tariffs on capital accumulation. However,  many  countries  subject  imports  of intermediates  to licensing
and other forms of control which in one way or the other constitute additional impediments  to their
imports. In any case, the existence  of binding  QRs on imported  intermediates  implies that their imports
are fixed but capital accumulation  still magnifies the distortion because it induces greater domestic
(inefficient)  production  of the imported intermediates.32
In contrast with most other LDCs import substitutes  of final goods in Chile appear to be labor
intensive  rather than capital intensive,  while exports are more capital intensive  than import  substitutes  of
final goods. The reason for this is that the export sectors are mostly  extraction  and processing  of natural
resources (fisheries, mining and forestry), which is where Chile's comparative advantages are most
prominent.  These activities, however, are not  only  intensive in  natural resources but  also are
characterized  by a very high capital/labor  ratio.  This peculiar  feature of natural resource rich countries
such as Chile implies that import substitution  activities  of final goods are not relatively capital intensive
vis-a-vis the export sector.  This explains  why a tariff on (final) import substitutes  causes the efficiency
of capital to increase.
In the majority  of LDCs where the import substitution  of both intermediate  and final goods are
capital intensive  and protected  by high tariffs, the social efficiency  of capital is likely to be even lower
due to the fact that capital accumulation  in this case induces  an expansion  of not only intermediates  but
also final import substitutes in detriment of the export sector.  Thus, the order of magnitude  of the
estimates  for the effects of tariffs on the social efficiency  of capital in Chile are not likely to be higher
than those corresponding  to other developing  countries. The  peculiarities  of the Chilean  economy  provide
reasons to expect that the Chilean estimates  are more likely to be on the low rather than on the high side
of the case of most other LDCs. Finally, given that the high degree of capital intensiveness  of production
of intermediates  tend to dominate  the results  and given  the existence  of wage  distortions  during the period
under analysis,  Chile appears  to share the typical structure  of distortions  prevailing  in other LDCs. This
suggests  that the results concerning  static losses are also quite relevant for other countries.
V.  Conclusion
After a large body of empirical  evidence  showed  that the efficiency  losses  associated with even
large price distortions were generally small at least using the conventional competitive  equilibrium33
framework,  economists turned to  various other  areas of  enquiry linking growth,  income and
microeconomic  policies.  One of these areas has been the analysis of the effect of trade and other
microdistortions  when imperfect  competition  prevails in domestic markets. A second area has been the
relationships  between  the trade regime and total factor productivity. A few recent cross-country  studies
have considered  the effects of trade openness  on the level of investment.'  In general, these new brand
of studies for LDCs has provided  mixed evidence  with the total factor productivity/trade  policy linkage,
appearing  quite robust while  the investment  level and domestic  competition  linkages  appearing  very weak.
This paper has shifted the emphasis  into a new line of inquiry, namely  the measurement  of the
social income losses induced by the reduction  of the investment  efficiency caused  by trade distortions.
The empirical findings suggest a strong negative effect of trade distortions  on the social efficiency  of
investment. Even what is considered  a moderate  (uniform)  tariff at 50% could cause a reduction in the
efficiency  of investments  of up to 23% compared  with a 0% tariff scenario.  The social income losses
over time caused  by the reduced investment  efficiency  are considerable. Countries  that have a moderate
investment  ratios of the order of 20% of GDP can experience  social income losses in excess of 18% in
30 years if tariffs are about 50%.  Only after a few years of capital accumulation  these dynamic losses
become substantially  larger than the conventional  static loss,.  -.  tariff distortions. In contrast with the
static losses, the reduction of investment  efficiency  has cumulative  effects through time which after just
a few years can be several times larger than the estimated  static losses.
The existence  of labor market distortions  causing unemployment  may increase the social value
of capital. This is due to the fact that capital accumulation  allows the economy  to become closer to the
production possibility frontier by increasing employment.  Since this occurs mostly because capital
accumulation  decreases the size of the effective  wage distortion, the increased  social efficiency  of capital
17/  Lopez (1990) is one of the few cross-country  studies that analyzes the role of trade policies on
capital accumulation.34
is essentially  a temporary  phenomenon. This is in clear contrast  with the losses  of investment  efficiency
due to trade distortions  which are essentially  permanent  due to the fact that the size of the trade distortion
does not disappear with capital accumulation.
This study confirms  previous  findings regarding  the relatively  modest  efficiency  losses  caused  by
the independent  effects of specific  distortions. However, we have found a considerable  synergy effect
when trade and wage distortions  coexist which lead to larger efficiency  losses. Still in the case of Chile
the continued effect of these distortions  is substantially  below the effect of investment  efficiency  losses.
For other LDCs characterized  by a much larger number of distortions  this synergy  effect is likely to be
even more important.
Finally, although  the empirical  results attain  only one country,  the qualitative  pattern  of static  and
investment  efficiency  losses is likely to be valid for most LDCs.  The key issue is the combination  of
price distortions favoring  capital intensive activity with wage distortions  that cause unemployment  and
underemployment. As shown by Krueger (1976) and Bhagwati  (1976) in their large multicountry  study
this pattern of distortion is indeed quite pervasive  among LDCs.  This paper has provided a systematic
framework  for the evaluation  of the static and investment  efficiency  losses  associated  witn interaction  of
two or more distortions.35
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